Selected Labor & Employment Law
Updates
compiled by Book Review/Updates Editor
This section of the Journalprovides notes on recent cases, pending or
newly-enacted legislation, and other current legal materials. The Updates
section is designed to aid the practitioner in relating the Journalarticles to
the daily practice of labor and employment law. The Journal welcomes
outside submissions of brief judicial and legislative summaries.
Court holds that warehouse employees who were not guaranteedfixed
hours or schedules and could bidfor regularjobs as they became available
were not "casual employees" as defined by the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA), and the employer thus was requiredto contribute tofund
on their behalf Even if the employer treated the employees as casual
employees, such practice could not contravene the express terms of the
CBA and the fund was not estoppedfrom claiming that the employer owed
contributions.Central States, Southeast, Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Kroger Co., 226 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 2000).
In an action where a pension fund sued an employer under ERISA
Section 515 to recover delinquent pension contributions, the trial court
interpreted the collective bargaining agreement's terms. The trial court's
determination that "part time" employees were "regular" employees (not
"casual" employees) was affirmed on appeal.
Court holds that evidence that an employer would have terminatedan
employee even in absence of unlawful retaliationbased on the disruptive
manner in which he pursued his discriminationcomplaints was sufficient
for submission to jury. Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d. 68 (2d Cir. Sept. 18,

2000).
Under Title VII, Section 706 - (g)(2)(B), a finding that an employer in
a mixed-motive case "would have taken the same action in the absence of
the impermissible motivating factor," limits the form of relief that a trial
court can order. Employees in such cases are not precluded from collecting
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attorney fees and costs or from receiving certain declaratory and injunctive
relief. The principal issue on appeal was whether this section applies to
Title VII mixed motive cases that are based on retaliation.
All other circuits that have considered the issue have concluded that
the section does not apply to mixed motive retaliation cases. This court, in
adopting the approach of the other circuits, held that proof by an employer
that it would have "taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor" acts as a complete bar to relief in Title
VII mixed motive retaliation cases.
Court holds that technicians who were on-call during all their offpremises time, were entitled to compensationfor on-call time. Also, time
spent in personal pursuits would not be subtracted from an award of
overtime compensation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
awardingprejudgment interestfor the entireperiod of recovery and did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to award liquidated damages. Finally,
there was no clear error infinding that the company's FLSA violation was
not willful, thus limiting damages award to the statute's two-year
limitations period. Pabst v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128
(10th Cir. Sept. 20, 2000).
The issue for the court was to decide "when 'on-call' time becomes
sufficiently onerous to render it compensable under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)." In addition to their regular shifts, Pabst and other
employees monitored many systems in several of the employer's buildings
on an on-call basis. They typically responded to between three and five
alarms each night, and their supervisor allegedly instructed them to report
only that on-call time which was spent actually responding to alarms, even
though they had to stay near home during that time.
The FLSA doesn't explicitly address the issue of on-call time. Under
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944), and Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the relevant inquiry is either whether an
employee is "engaged to wait" or "waiting to be engaged" or alternatively
whether on-call time is spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer
or the employee. Courts in the Tenth Circuit also focus on the degree to
which the burden on the employee interferes with his or her personal
pursuits. In light of the relevant circumstances, the court found that Pabst's
on-call time was compensable overtime.
Court holds en banc that the interactive process under the ABA is a
mandatory rather than permissive obligationon the part of employers, and
is triggered by giving notice of the employee's disability and desire for
accommodation. They also held that the seniority system is not a per se
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bar to reassignment being a reasonable accommodation and the employee
in this case failed to establish retaliation in that he did not rebut the
employer's reason for putting him on job-injury leave. Barnett v. U.S. Air,
228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 2000).
Barnett alleged that his employer violated the ADA by denying him
accommodation, failing to engage in the interactive process, and retaliating
against him for filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).
Many new issues were raised in this case. First, the ADA's definition
of "qualified individual with a disability" includes individuals who could
perform the essential functions of a reassignment position, with or without
reasonable accommodation, even if they can't perform the essential
functions of their current position.
Second, the court joined "the vast majority of our sister circuits" in
holding that the interactive process is a mandatory rather than a permissive
obligation on the part of employers under the ADA. This obligation is
triggered when an employee (or his representative) gives notice of his
disability and the desire for accommodation.
In circumstances where an employee is unable to request an
accommodation, and the employer knows of the employee's disability, the
employer must assist in initiating the interactive process. If an employer
fails to engage in good faith in the interactive process, and a reasonable
accommodation would have been possible, then the employer is liable
under the ADA. Furthermore, an employer can't prevail at the summary
judgment stage if there is a genuine dispute as to whether the employer
engaged in good faith in the interactive process.
Third, the court observed that "[tihe question of whether an
employer's unilaterally imposed seniority system trumps a disabled
employee's right to reassignment [under the ADA] has not been answered
directly by any other circuit." The court held that "reassignment is a
reasonable accommodation and.., a seniority system is not a per se bar to
reassignment. However, a seniority system is a factor in the undue
hardship analysis. A case-by-case fact intensive analysis is required to
determine whether any particular reassignment would constitute an undue
hardship to the employer. If there is no undue hardship, a disabled
employee who seeks reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, if
otherwise qualified for a position, should receive the position rather than
merely have an opportunity to compete with non-disabled employees."
Finally, most other circuits have adopted the Title VII framework for
analyzing ADA retaliation claims. The court joined those circuits, holding
that "[t]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, a
plaintiff must show (1) that he or she engaged in or was engaging in
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activity protected by the ADA, (2) the employer subjected him or her to an
adverse employment decision, and (3) that there was a causal link between
the protected activity and the employer's action."
Court holds that an employee's problems resulted from his
altercationswith co-workers over work issues, and because of his apparent
homosexuality, not because of his sex, thus defeating the hostile work
environment claim. The employee could not maintain a Title VII
retaliationclaim absent any adverse employment action and the employee
failed to establish a sex discrimination claim premised on the employer's
alleged differential response to harassmentcomplaints. Spearman v. Ford
Motor Co. 2000 WL 164628 (7th Cir. Nov. 3, 2000)
Spearman sued his employer alleging sexual harassment in violation
of Title VII. Spearman was a homosexual male who was allegedly
subjected to various discriminatory statements made by male co-workers at
the factory where they worked. These comments, targeting at his
homosexuality and perceived lack of masculinity, included sexually
explicit insults and graffiti. Spearman argued that the statements were
motivated by "sex-stereotypes" because his co-workers perceived him to be
too feminine to fit the male image of a factory worker.
Same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII to the
degree it occurs "because of' sex. This means that it is unlawful under
Title VII to discriminate against women because they are women and
against men because they are men. Sexual harassment based solely upon a
person's sexual orientation is not an unlawful employment practice under
Title VII.
The court noted that "according to Oncale and Price Waterhouse, we
must consider any sexually explicit language or stereotypical statements
within the context of all of the evidence of harassment in the case, and then
determine whether the evidence as a whole creates a reasonable inference
that the plaintiff was discriminated against because of his sex." Applying
this standard, the court found that the statements complained of by
Spearman were motivated by either his homosexuality or work-related
disputes, not "because of' Spearman's sex. Therefore, the trial court was
correct in granting summary judgment for the employer.
Court held that: (1) society was not a "state actor" amenable to suit
under § 1983, and (2) age-based discriminationwas not the determinative
factor in terminationdecision, and society thus was not liable under ADEA
even ifits reasonsfor termination were pretextual. Schnabel v. Abramson,
2000 WL 1676601 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2000).
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The Second Circuit held that "Legal Aid" is not considered a state
actor amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also held that in
the wake of Reeves v. SandersonPlumbing Products,Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097
(2000), a trial court may grant summary judgment in favor of an employer
on an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The trial court
may do so where an employee has established his prima facie case and
presented evidence of pretext.
Reeves prevents courts from imposing a per se rule requiring ADEA
plaintiffs to offer more than a prima facie case and evidence of pretext.
However, the court stated "we decline to hold that no ADEA defendant
may succeed on a summary judgment motion so long as the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case and presented evidence of pretext. Rather,
we hold that the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves clearly mandates a
case-by-case approach, with a court examining the entire record to
determine whether the plaintiff could satisfy his 'ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff."'
Court holds that the continuing violation doctrine applied to permit
the introduction of evidence of pre-limitationsperiod conduct in an action
against a railroadfor racialdiscriminationand retaliationunder Title VII.
Morgan v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 2000 WL 1672651 (9th
Cir. Nov. 8, 2000).
The issue on appeal centered on application of the "continuing
violation" doctrine to Morgan's Title VII claims of race discrimination,
hostile environment, and retaliation. The court has never adopted a strict
notice requirement as the litmus test for application of the continuing
violation doctrine.
Under Fiedler v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000), a
continuing violation can be established by showing either a serial violation
or a systemic violation. In either type of violation, at least some part of the
violation must have occurred within the limitations period. Applying this
to Morgan's claims, the court concluded that continuing violations had been
sufficiently established to preclude summary judgment.

